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Abstract 
This article examines the effect of Bush administration's human rights preferences during the war on 
terror with respect to torture by analysing a large-n sample of public legitimation strategies of both 
the United States and other members of international society. The article asks two questions: first, 
has the defection of the United States from these human rights norms led to a ‘norm cascade’ that 
delegitimized the norms? Second, did the material preponderance of the United States help it to 
legitimate its preferences in international society? The article argues that despite initial ambiguity in 
the response to the Bush administration's preferences from key liberal states, there is little evidence 
by the end of the Bush administration's term that a core group of states supported their 
preferences, nor did its material preponderance help the Bush administration to legitimate its 
position. 
Introduction 
In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, many states enacted counterterrorism 
policies that explicitly presupposed a reduction or elimination of human rights protections in the 
name of security.  These policies were not only enacted by states with perennial human rights 
problems, but also by states within the liberal western zone, the same states that had contributed 
significantly to the expansion and entrenchment of the international human rights system since the 
end of the Second World War (Dunne 2007, 270; Landman 2006, 124).  Of these policies, human 
rights advocates were particularly troubled with the Bush administration’s support for, and use of 
‘enhanced interrogation techniques,’ particularly given the accusations of torture and mistreatment 
that followed in their footsteps.  This concern was no doubt justified since torture, together with 
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, is arguably one of the most serious violations of human 
dignity.i  The prohibition against torture is entrenched as a fundamental right, or a right with highly 
legalised norms in international society, reflecting this ethical concern (Dunne 2007, 270).   
Despite the seemingly well-established status of torture as a non-derogable right, Ryder 
McKeown (2009) argued that 9/11 caused a domestic norm cascade whereby torture, which had 
been largely condemned by US elites and in public opinion, was not just openly discussed and 
advocated within the public sphere by political elites, but also commanded a significant minority of 
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public support, even after the revelations of Abu Ghraib.ii   David Forsythe (2011, 91) argued that the 
paucity of domestic opposition to the Bush administration’s enhanced interrogation techniques 
meant that torture was effectively a national policy up to 2005.  The evidence for McKeown and 
Forsythe’s arguments is significant.  The Bush administration produced a well-documented legal 
justification for interrogation techniques that arguably constituted torture (Greenberg and Dratel 
2005; Forsythe 2011, 65-67, 82-89).  This was reflected in practice through detainee abuse, 
particularly at the hands of the military and the CIA.iii  This abuse eventually led to domestic legal 
changes favouring a slightly more expansive definition of torture than that which was originally 
championed by the Bush administration,iv but the legislative debates over what acts should 
constitute torture, and were therefore illegal, were sometimes based on relatively small differences 
of opinion.v  Despite Congress passing laws prohibiting torture and the Bush administration 
tightening interrogation restrictions, the Bush administration refused to support the non-derogable 
character of torture, claiming alternatively that it should be able to use special techniques if the 
situation warranted it, arguing that necessity could negate potential criminal liability.vi  The Bush 
administration’s wilful and coordinated changes to interrogation policy, and the subsequent public 
shift in attitude in support of such matters, are well-researched.vii This shift presents a pressing 
problem for human rights activists who would prefer a return to a stronger domestic consensus 
against the use of torture, particularly given fears of what policies might become acceptable should 
another major terrorist attack be successful.   
However, there is a larger issue concerning whether the Bush administration’s defection 
from fundamental human rights norms had damaging effects on the international norms against 
torture.  Specifically, was this domestic norm cascade matched by an international cascade, whereby 
the use of torturous methods became legitimate within a key group of states, leading to the 
possibility of widespread internalisation within international society?  There are two reasons why 
activists might be particularly worried that it was the United States that defected from the torture 
norm.  First, the United States has played a central role in determining the scope of human rights 
norms from World War II onwards (Evans 1996, 8).  Given this role, the United States could have a 
similar influence in its defection.  Second, some scholarship suggests that material power might help 
states to legitimate their preferences within international society.  The Bush administration’s 
preference for a more lenient definition of torture could thus pose a serious challenge to 
international norms prohibiting torture should it be able to leverage its material preponderance to 
legitimate its human rights preferences.viii   
As problematic as the domestic norm cascade is for human rights activists, if it were 
matched by a similar one internationally, then not only would they need to worry about the 
direction of future US policy, but also the effect a more normalised conception of torture would 
have on the policies of other states within international society, particularly states who might 
otherwise refrain from such behaviour.  Some scholars have already voiced their concern that this 
might be the case.  In 2007, Tim Dunne (2007, 284) argued that US conduct could lead to a norm 
cascade in which torture in the name of anti-terrorism becomes acceptable within international 
society.  Other authors argued that it could also degrade the international human rights and 
humanitarian system in general (Fitzpatrick 2003, 242; Skogly 2009, 830).  Ryder McKeown, who 
argued that such a norm cascade occurred domestically, hedged his bets by claiming that this would 
weaken the international norm, but then contended in the next sentence that recent scholarship 
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‘effectively argued that a crisis of legitimacy within the United States does not necessarily constitute 
a crisis in the norm itself.’ (2009, 19-20)   
Alternatively, if such a norm cascade were unsuccessful internationally, then not only would 
there be less concern over the general use of torture within the rest of international society, but 
these norms might influence the United States to abstain from torture despite the domestic norm 
cascade.  Julie Harrelson-Stephens and Rhonda Callaway (2009, 450) took up this argument by 
claiming that the effect of US conduct was not negative on the whole because the 
institutionalisation of human rights among other Western states was able to uphold the regime 
absent the United States. 
This article contributes to this debate by analysing the practices of legitimacy between the 
Bush administration and the rest of international society to ascertain whether the United States was 
successful in legitimating its preferences regarding enhanced interrogation techniques, particularly 
given its material preponderance.  Legitimacy is a useful lens to study the possibility of norm change 
because even though it appears that the allegations of torture were limited within the western 
liberal zone to the United States, we still might worry that the Bush administration was successful in 
weakening the torture norm.  Other states might not have acted similarly because US interrogation 
measures were sufficient to meet their needs.  Thus, instead of waiting to see whether other liberal 
states similarly engage in torturous methods,ix by scrutinising the practices of legitimacy within 
international society concerning the use of enhanced interrogation techniques this article can 
provide evidence to support or oppose the assertion that the United States, through its conduct and 
advocacy, created an international norm cascade favouring its definition of torture.  This article 
argues that, contrary to the fears expressed by some scholars, there is little evidence of a norm 
cascade corresponding with Bush administration preferences within international society.  However, 
Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway’s contention that the other Western states will uphold the human 
rights regime absent the United States cannot be fully supported either, because until the final few 
years of the Bush administration these states reacted ambivalently towards US legitimation 
strategies compared to other members of international society. 
This article proceeds by discussing legitimacy in international relations, particularly the 
contested relationship between legitimacy and material power.  It then outlines the method used to 
collect and analyse the empirical data.  Finally, it provides an account of the evolution of the 
legitimation strategies of both the Bush administration and other members of international society, 
using these to demonstrate the strength of the thesis. 
Norms and Legitimacy in International Society 
In his classic study of the function of legitimacy in society, Max Weber (1968, 11, 213-215) argued 
for the existence of legitimacy, as ‘custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of 
solidarity’ could not completely explain why specific commands are obeyed within a community.  
Agents can be oriented to believe in the existence of a legitimate order, where they act according to 
a set of norms that they follow, ‘not because they think it will serve some exogenously given end, 
but because they think the norms are legitimate and therefore want to follow them.’ (Wendt 1999, 
272-273)x  The legitimacy of any ideational structure exerts a compliance pull or capacity to obligate.  
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Though a hypothetical absolute, empirically one uses the idea of legitimacy to understand relative 
pull or obligation (Franck 1990, 26, 205-206).     
Ian Clark (2005, 12) argued that international society is an important testing ground for 
legitimacy since it lacks the coercive sovereign of domestic politics that would otherwise help to 
maintain order.xi  One of its functions is to encourage actors to obey or resist an institution or rule 
over and above calculations of self-interest (Clark 2005, 5; Hurd 1999, 379).  Given this function, 
particularly in the way that it can obligate compliance through either the internalisation of the norm 
or increasing the costs of defection, actors have an interest in legitimating their private beliefs when 
they are not highly socialised into particular norms.  For this to happen, Clark (2005, 3) argued that 
an actor must engage in practices of legitimacy.  These are empirically reflected in the deliberation 
of norms and a search for a tolerable consensus within a particular distribution of power.   
Though Clark asserted that both discourse and material power are important in the practices 
of legitimacy, the existing scholarship on the relationship between legitimacy and material power is 
contentious.  Ian Hurd (2005, 501), for instance, argued that the compliance pull of legitimacy is so 
strong that even a hegemon cannot be seen as violating the “rules of the game” too often.  Norms 
will bind hegemons to the extent that they either value the legitimacy that legitimate conduct gives 
them or abhor the costs of illegitimate conduct.  Additionally, Reus-Smit (2007, 165) argued that 
power itself cannot generate legitimacy.  Material power might inspire feelings of anxiety or fear, 
but unless there is agreement on acceptable conduct between the hegemon and the rest of the 
states, there is no legitimacy.  Specifically with respect to the United States, Reus-Smit warned that it 
is a mistake to think that ‘America’s unparalleled material resources can be translated into political 
influence unproblematically.’ (Reus-Smit 2003, 423) 
Alternatively, other scholars argue that materiality can have large effects on the practice of 
legitimacy.  First, material factors dictate the edge of feasible action for any state (Wendt 1999, 111).  
Materiality therefore may allow some states to take costs that other states could not absorb, and as 
such, powerful states may be less dependent on acting with respect to legitimate norms.  Second, a 
powerful state might also be able to legitimate its own preferences more easily than other states.  
By routinely violating the original norm and offering competing interpretations, the state can make it 
increasingly difficult for the norm to be reaccepted, particularly if it is willing to invest its material 
capacity to promote the new norm (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 57; Philpott 2001, 26; Hurd 2005, 
501; Hurd 2007, 202).  Given the powerful ‘lock-in’ effects should the attempted norm cascade 
proceed to internalisation, where the norm becomes a taken-for-granted aspect of life outside of 
general political debate, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth  argued that, ‘the massive potential 
long-term benefits of winning legitimacy for the new practices it favors may induce a far-sighted 
hegemon to accept considerable near-term costs and risks.’ (2005, 517-518)  Thus, ‘even if acting 
unilaterally seems costly in the short run, if it helps lead to new rules, norms, or institutions the 
hegemon favors, then it might pay off in the long term.’ (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 518)  If this is 
the case, it is clear that there is a potential threat for international human rights and humanitarian 
norms from the domestic norm cascade.  If the United States were able to absorb the costs of the 
initial illegitimacy of its conduct long enough to legitimate its own preferences with enough states, 
or force other states into the new norm until it was normalised, this could lead to the prospect of an 




To analyse the practices of legitimacy this paper infers conduct based on rhetorical action.  
Coined by Frank Schimmelfennig, rhetorical action is the ‘strategic use of norm-based arguments’ 
that occurs in an institutional environment where ‘political actors are concerned about their 
reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their preferences and behavior.’ 
(Schimmelfennig 2001, 48)  Schimmelfennig (2001, 64) argued that rhetorical action is particularly 
important where international structures cannot enforce compliance and where there is little 
chance that there will be negative domestic responses to actions illegitimate in the international 
community.  The torture norm meets both of these conditions.  Like all human rights norms, there 
are relatively few legal means to ensure that states comply with their treaty obligations outside of 
verbal critique.  Additionally, the successful domestic norm cascade ensured that a significant 
minority, sometimes a plurality, of the US population supported the use of torture, greatly reducing 
the domestic political costs arising from the implementation of the policy.xii 
According to Schimmelfennig, though states are technically free to defend their sovereign 
interests, there are limits to these strategic manipulations:  
First, to the extent that the standard of legitimacy is clearly and unambiguously 
defined as well as internally consistent, it becomes difficult to rhetorically 
circumvent its practical implications.  Second, actors must be careful not to lose 
their credibility as community members when manipulating social values and 
norms.  Above all they must avoid creating the impression that they use values 
and norms cynically and inconsistently. (Schimmelfennig 2001, 65)   
Importantly, actors under social pressure to conform to legitimate norms do not necessarily change 
their interests, but may only refrain from illegitimate behaviour to avoid its costs – rhetorical action 
does not assume successful persuasion as an explanation for compliance (Schimmelfennig 2001, 
65).xiii   
To analyse US legitimation strategies, I structured the analysis around the four tactics provided by 
Justin Morris et al. for states who wish to defect from legitimate norms.  First, as discussed above, 
there is secrecy, where the state conducts the illegitimate act without the knowledge of other 
actors.  If the actions remain secret, then the state has successfully avoided the costs of illegitimate 
behaviour.  If not, then the state pays costs for the illegitimate action and potential damage to its 
reputation for its hypocrisy had it also openly supported the norm.  Once public, the state has a 
second option of overt violation, where it breaches the norm without attempting to legitimate its 
actions.  If the norm is well-established, this will be a short term strategy as other states will 
challenge the norm violation, and even the most diplomatically isolated states routinely justify their 
illegitimate actions when challenged.xiv  Given that the state must engage in practices of legitimacy, 
the third tactic is justification, where the state claims that it is in compliance with the norm if 
“properly” interpreted.  An example would be if the Bush administration claimed that it was acting 
legally, but with a significantly different understanding of the law than the rest of international 
society.  Lastly the state can attempt innovation, where it actively argues for a change in the existing 
norms to match its preferences.  This would occur if the Bush administration openly advocates, for 
instance, that torture should be allowed under particular circumstances instead of being jus cogens 
(Morris et al., 5-6).   
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To judge the responses of other members of international society, Hurd (1999, 390-391) 
suggested that there are three indicators that suggest that a norm either has or does not have 
legitimacy.  The first is the rate of compliance.  Relatively high rates of compliance are a prerequisite 
for legitimacy, although they are not sufficient as the compliance could be coercive.  Second, and 
most important for this article, are the reasons given for the compliance.  Political actors will justify 
their motivations for complying with or abandoning a prevailing norm.  The reasons given for 
compliance and non-compliance can yield additional data to determine whether the action was 
caused by legitimacy.  Third, we might examine how other actors within the international society 
respond to a norm or institution under threat.  If they respond in a way that upholds the pre-existing 
norm, it is more likely that the norm or institution in question is considered legitimate.  It must be 
noted that publicly-aired criticism, which will provide most of the data for this paper, is a relatively 
high-risk strategy since it potentially harms the bilateral relationship between the state or 
organisation and the United States (Apodaca 2006, 17-18; Forsythe 2006, 155; Donnelly 2003, 165-
166).  Such overt legitimation tactics taken by actors demonstrates a willingness to absorb costs to 
uphold the institutionalised norm (Forsythe 2006, 156).  
Instead of relying on a few legitimation arguments that I claim to be typical, I included all 
public statements I found by the United States and other actors in international society.xv  With this 
strategy, this article is able to show how legitimacy strategies shifted over time and it limits the 
probability of cherry-picking particular discourses that are more representative of my political biases 
than of the intended strategies of the actors.  I have omitted any statements made while officials 
were not in public office, as I am not interested in their private beliefs, but how these beliefs are 
strategically tempered by their knowledge of legitimate norms through rhetorical action.  The data 
consisted of 322 articles collected from the Nexis database of periodicals.  These were obtained by 
running a query for all articles that discuss US torture or mistreatment from 11 September 2001 to 
20 January 2009 in the Nexis category “Major World Publications,” with the addition of major US 
television and radio network transcripts.  I then filtered these articles, keeping those that contained 
government officials or spokespersons for international organisations making legitimation 
arguments concerning the potentially torturous nature of US interrogations.xvi  Legitimation 
arguments that spoke to other human rights problems or referenced torture implicitly were 
excluded.  For example, a discourse concerning the closure of Guantanamo would be excluded 
unless torture was mentioned explicitly, even if the discussion might indirectly pertain to 
perceptions of and reactions to torture.  Though this limited the potential data to draw upon, it 
allowed a more independent examination of the torture norm given other potential human rights 
disagreements occurring at the time.xvii  Multiple legitimation discourses in a single statement were 
all accepted – there was no judgement over whether one legitimation strategy might be dominant 
over the others.   
This data was then broken up into two categories of norm entrepreneurial arguments, legal, 
which explicitly referenced legal agreements or ‘lawfulness,’ and moral, which either attacked or 
defended the US interrogation program without reference to legal norms.xviii  I argue that 
differentiating between legal and moral legitimation strategies is necessary due to the unique 
position of the law within international society.  Alan James argued that legal frameworks 
encompass all activities that international society deems important for fear that non-codification 
would lead to ambiguity.  Though it is clear that the law is broken by members of international 
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society, it still enjoys a special status as ‘the very centre of international society’s normative 
framework, supporting a structure of expectations without which the intercourse of states would 
surely suffer an early collapse.’ (James 1973, 67-68)  This special status might arise, as Martti 
Koskenniemi (2005, 567) argues, because international law is a common language that allows states 
to transcend political and cultural differences, which gives members of international society, ‘a 
means to articulate particular preferences or positions in a formal fashion.’ (Koskenniemi 2005, 
570)xix  If these ideas hold – that international law is a formal mechanism through which preferences 
can be presented in international society that holds a special status in creating structured 
expectations – then there is good reason to separate legal legitimation strategies from moral 
legitimation strategies.  The use of legal legitimation strategies should indicate more of a 
commitment to the promotion or reproduction of a particular norm, and the lack of them might 
indicate that the state believes that it cannot properly legitimate its preferences internationally, at 
least not sufficiently to create the norm cascade necessary to change the international legal 
framework.  
The analysis of the data rests on the following hypotheses of the relationship between 
legitimacy and material power outlined in the theory section.  In general, where US legitimation 
discourses favour innovation, that is, where there is an open claim to change the norm, one can 
make the claim that this is a more likely indicator of an actor confidently pursuing a norm cascade 
than if they were to rely on justificatory legitimation discourses.  Similarly, because of the special 
position of international law, legal legitimation discourses are more likely to signal a confidence in 
pursuing a norm cascade than are moral legitimation discourses.  If the United States coercively 
enforced its conception of the norm, and subsequently caused a norm cascade as other members of 
international society became socialised into its preferences, then independent of the starting 
discourses of the states, which could be hostile, neutral, or accepting, a critical mass of states must 
become either more accepting or less hostile to the new norm over time, reflecting the progress of 
their socialisation.xx  Alternatively, should states be increasingly hostile to the preferences of the 
United States, then this would lend evidence that the United States was unsuccessful in creating an 
international norm cascade because, as Hurd argued, this demonstrates that states are openly 
reacting to the violation of a norm that they believe to be legitimate. 
Given that the most serious evidence of detainee abuse, both in terms of frequency and 
severity, occurred between 2004 and 2005 with the revelations of alleged torture in Iraq and the 
secret CIA detention programme, the proceeding analysis is divided into three periods.  The first 
period spans from the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to the beginning of the Abu Ghraib scandal.  The 
second period spans between 2004 and 2005, when the majority of the scandals, including the CIA 
black sites, were publicly unveiled.  The third period spans from 2006 to the end of the Bush 
administration, where there were no further publicly-revealed incidents of torture on the part of the 
United States.  This division will allow us to see how international society reacted to initial claims of 
abuse and the subsequent unveiling of widespread abuse, finishing with the continued diplomatic 
repercussions of the abuse that occurred to the end of the Bush administration’s second term.    
Contestations of Legitimacy 
8 
 
Given the hypothetical absolute legal prohibition of torture and the persistent media questioning 
over the appropriateness of the interrogation techniques used at Guantanamo Bay, the Bush 
administration was relatively successful in avoiding costs of its potentially illegitimate interrogation 
methods between 2001 and 2003.  The Bush administration engaged in few moral legitimation 
discourses outside of stressing the unique threat posed by terrorism and promoting the idea that 
detainees were taught to lie about alleged acts of torture.xxi  Instead, the Bush administration 
focussed on either denying the factuality of torture allegationsxxii or appealing to national security to 
avoid discussions of the interrogation techniques,xxiii both of which led to no challenge by other 
liberal states.  Some liberal states, in fact, argued that there was no evidence to support claims of 
mistreatment,xxiv or argued that the United States, as a constitutional democracy, should not be 
judged in the same light as other human rights abusing states.xxv  Only a few states with poor human 
rights records argued that the United States was acting hypocritically given its supposed 
commitment to uphold the norm against torture.xxvi   
The Bush administration partially pursued a strategy of norm innovation through a legal 
argument that the Geneva Conventions, which prohibit torture, do not apply to the detainees.xxvii  It 
additionally claimed that detainee treatment was lawful with respect to international humanitarian 
law,xxviii domestic law,xxix or ‘international law’ in general,xxx which might point to an additional 
justificatory approach as the administration claimed that its questionable actions were within the 
accepted norms if ‘properly’ interpreted.  There was little engagement with the legal claims of the 
Bush administration among members of international society outside of a statement by the United 
Kingdom that the prisoners should be treated under the Geneva Conventions (Gardiner 2002), and 
Kofi Annan arguing that the prisoners should be treated according to international law (United 
Nations 2002). 
The lack of serious engagement in the moral and legal legitimation strategies of the Bush 
administration by liberal states might indicate that there was some consensus that the United States 
was acting appropriately given the circumstances – at least appropriately enough to lead states to 
avoid incurring the potential costs of speaking out.  This is particularly the case given that 
international organisations felt that there was enough information available to openly question 
whether the interrogation techniques used were permissible,xxxi and warned against tradeoffs 
between human rights protection and counterterrorism.xxxii   
The period between 2004 and 2006 is important as the evidence of potentially torturous 
acts was overwhelming, fitting Hurd’s criteria of a “norm under threat” more than any other period 
in the Bush administration’s term.  Instead of promoting overt norm innovation through legal 
legitimation, the Bush administration primarily used a policy of justification through moral 
legitimation.  The Bush administration contended that its interrogation techniques were not 
torture,xxxiii though administration officials also appealed to the inherent relativism in any definition 
of torture.xxxiv  The administration’s legitimation practices also exhibited the hallmarks of a 
justification strategy by claiming that the treatment of the detainees was respectful,xxxv that torture 
was immoral,xxxvi and occasionally that torture was ineffective.xxxvii  Finally, in response to the 
evidence of mistreatment, the administration argued that the mistreatment that had taken place 
was not systematic,xxxviii and that all perpetrators of detainee mistreatment either were going to be 
brought to justice or, later on, had been brought to justice.xxxix  Augmenting this argument 
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concerning the non-systemic nature of the mistreatment were claims that it was not in the character 
of the United States to torture,xl that liberal democracies do not cover up torture allegations,xli 
particularly as they had an open media and were monitored by international organisations.xlii  At the 
same time, to provide the impetus for the contraction in the meaning of torture, the Bush 
administration argued that the exceptional threat of terrorism required good intelligence so that the 
state could defend its citizens, suggesting that new and effective methods might need to be 
employed.xliii  This is an innovation argument whereby potentially torturous methods should be 
legitimate if they alleviate intelligence gaps in situations of emergency.  So although the majority of 
legitimation discourses were justificatory, the Bush administration was still willing to make 
arguments that directly suggest innovation to weaken the otherwise absolute torture norm.   
This focus on justification strategy was also reflected within the Bush administration’s legal 
legitimation strategies, where it continued to stress that its treatment was in line with the Geneva 
Conventions,xliv and, for the first time, international human rights law.xlv  There were also generalised 
statements that contended that the administration was acting in accordance with international 
law,xlvi the law in general,xlvii or a combination of international and domestic law,xlviii all of which 
merely made the claim without explaining how this was the case.  There were also some open 
attempts at moral and legal norm innovation.  The Bush administration continued to promote the 
norm entrepreneurial idea that the detainees should not be covered under the Geneva 
Conventions.xlix  From the perspective of international human rights law, it argued that there were 
geographical limits to the applicability of the Convention Against Torture that did not correspond to 
Guantanamo Bay.l   
In sum, their legitimation strategies suggest a primary policy of justification.  The 
administration argued that it did not officially engage in torture – which was morally repugnant – yet 
instead of arguing outright that the torture norm should be changed, the administration argued that 
it should be upheld, though implicitly in a form that allowed for greater interrogation flexibility.  
However, there were still elements of norm innovation within both the moral and legal discourses, 
suggesting that the Bush administration was still serious in making permanent changes to 
international law and norms that would exclude certain people from the norm prohibiting torture 
altogether, instead of merely contracting the definition of what constitutes torture. 
There was a mixed reaction within international society when reports of mistreatment 
surfaced, suggesting that the Bush administration was somewhat successful in legitimating its 
preferences given the jus cogens prohibition of torture.  There were certainly states that made 
statements which could not be considered supportive of the Bush administration’s actions.  Some 
claimed that they were shocked by the abuse, li called for investigations,lii warned of the tradeoffs 
between counterterrorism and human rights,liii or openly worried about the potential harm done to 
the international system by US conduct.liv  States with poor human rights records were particularly 
outspoken, and used the opportunity to openly characterise the US abuses as torture.lv  These states 
also suggested that the United States was therefore not in a position to reprimand themlvi and 
should focus more on its own problems,lvii sometimes explicitly because it had lost the moral high 
ground.lviii  International organisations were similarly hostile to US legitimation claims. They called 
for investigations,lix argued that the United States had lost its moral high ground because of the 
mistreatment,lx and reminded the United States not to make trade-offs between counterterrorism 
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and human rights.lxi  Unlike all other actors within international society, some also openly contended 
that torture was ineffective as an interrogation method.lxii  All of these responses uphold freedom 
from torture as a fundamental right, suggesting that the Bush administration failed to legitimate its 
constricted definition of torture.   
On the other hand, some states within the liberal zone echoed the moral legitimation 
discourses of the Bush administration, reflecting on how the extraordinary threat posed by terrorism 
might require new intelligence-gathering methods.lxiii  Other liberal states supported the Bush 
administration’s claim that there was no systematic abuse, arguing that there were proper 
procedures in place to prevent abuse,lxiv or claiming that the United States had given them 
reassurances that torture was not taking place,lxv claims that should be taken seriously either 
because the United States was a democracylxvi or because their state had a good relationship with 
the United States.lxvii  There is also some evidence that states within the liberal zone did not want to 
publically engage with the issue.  This is best demonstrated by Western government efforts to 
prevent Cuba from bringing a United Nations Human Rights Commission resolution to the table that 
would have called on the Commission to investigate conditions at Guantanamo Bay (Fowler 2004; 
Bassir 2004). 
Very few states appealed to international law in their legitimation strategies.  Some 
suggested that the US was not respecting international norms,lxviii but few, and only those states with 
poor human rights records themselves, challenged the US interpretation of international law.lxix  
Conversely, international organisations were significantly more active.  They argued that US conduct 
did not respect international human rights lawlxx or international law in general.lxxi  Some reminded 
the United States of the doctrine of command responsibility in human rights abuses,lxxii classified 
certain techniques used by the United States as being legally torture or tantamount to torture,lxxiii 
and argued that the United States did not have the legal competence to define torture.lxxiv 
Though there was clear opposition from international organisations, some of the state 
discourses suggest a leniency towards US conduct that might reflect a norm that had been 
weakened by US conduct and legitimation strategies.  This is particularly the case given that the 
states echoing the Bush administration legitimation strategies included several liberal democracies.  
However, a European diplomat speaking to the abuse in Iraq in 2004 noted that, ‘It's very clear they 
want European governments to stop pushing on this. They were stuck on the defensive for weeks, 
but suddenly the line has toughened up incredibly,’ (Henderson 2005) suggesting that the United 
States was putting pressure on its allies to prevent criticism.  As such, coercion may partially explain 
the mixed messages.  If this coercion explains the duality in response, then the primary question 
would be to see whether this ambiguity turns into acceptance over time, reflecting states voluntarily 
coming to the side of the Bush administration by being socialised into the coerced position.   
Overall, the success of the Bush administration legitimation strategies in this period was 
mixed.  Though it was successful where liberal states echoed its moral legitimation discourses, 
lending evidence to their legitimacy, there were also discourses from these states expressing shock 
or worry about the treatment.  International organisations and states with poor human rights 
records, alternatively, came out uniformly against US legitimation strategies.  Given the purported 
strength of the torture norm, the seemingly contradictory reaction by states within the Western 
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liberal zone suggests that this strength might be illusionary, either because the norm is not 
sufficiently socialised within the liberal zone or because US coercion was successful in preventing 
potential displeasure from being expressed.  On the other side of the coin, the reaction by 
international organisations and states with poor human rights records points to some strength in the 
norm.  Following the logic of rhetorical action, even if the states with poor human rights records 
were hypocritical in their criticism, it still indicates that they believed the norm to be of sufficient 
strength to be of strategic use against the United States. 
Between 2006 and 2008, the moral legitimation strategies of the Bush administration 
focussed on the utility and professionalism of the interrogations,lxxv stressing that they produced 
actionable intelligence.lxxvi  There were still a few officials who attempted to legitimate a state of 
exception,lxxvii some reinforcing the unusual danger of the detainees.lxxviii  For the first time the Bush 
administration directly claimed that it did not use torture.lxxix  It continued to argue that torture was 
immoral,lxxx but at the same time made statements that either challenged the idea of a firm 
definition of torture or gave exceptionally vague definitions of what would constitute torture.lxxxi  
Members of the Bush administration even suggested, though not explicitly, that waterboarding was 
not torture.lxxxii  These moral legitimation discourses point much more strongly to a justification 
strategy where torture is impermissible, but certain acts should not be considered torture because 
of their utility in obtaining intelligence.  The Bush administration also ended all appeals to 
international law.  Instead, it focussed on legitimating its position through appeals to the domestic 
legality of the interrogations.lxxxiii  This abandonment of legal legitimation strategies based on 
international law, the emphasis on the utility and professionalism of the interrogations, and a move 
to the direct denial of torture claims suggests that the Bush administration had abandoned any norm 
innovation previously present with its justificatory strategies.     
There was a noticeable drop in supportive legitimation strategies across all sections of 
international society.  Only Australia continued to openly support US practices, arguing that sleep 
deprivation did not constitute torture and continuing to assert that assurances had been given that 
the United States did not torture detainees (Butterly and Veness 2006).  States with poor human 
rights records continued to air their previous claims, including that the United States commits 
torture,lxxxiv that the United States was therefore not in a position to reprimand them,lxxxv and that 
the United States had lost its moral high ground.lxxxvi  International organisations also expressed their 
concern at allegations of abuse,lxxxvii called for further investigations,lxxxviii argued that the United 
States had lost its moral high ground,lxxxix and worried that US conduct might have negative effects 
on the international human rights system.xc  Perhaps more problematically for the United States, 
some states within the western liberal zone started changing policy to reflect the risk of the United 
States mistreating detainees in its custody.xci  This suggests that contrary to the coercion model of 
norm development, in which reactions of illegitimacy or neutrality are eventually replaced with 
reactions of legitimacy, states were becoming less accepting of US conduct.  The cohesion of the 
core group of states necessary for a norm cascade seemed to be falling apart, suggesting that the 





Despite the initial success of the Bush administration in avoiding significant criticism over its 
interrogation techniques, as its term progressed there is evidence that its ability to translate this into 
a norm cascade was not successful.  This is certainly the case with respect to the administration’s 
attempts at norm innovation, where not only is there no recorded support for its preferences, but 
even its own open support for its preferences was eventually abandoned.  Whether the Bush 
administration’s justificatory strategy to contract the meaning of torture was successful is less clear, 
although several observations suggest that here too it was unsuccessful.  First, international 
organisations exhibited a fervent opposition to the possibility of loosening the torture norm 
throughout the Bush administration term, demonstrating their utility in promoting human rights 
norms in the face of the more ambiguous reactions from liberal states.  Second, the United States 
faced constant criticism from states with poor human rights records, particularly from the Abu 
Ghraib scandal onwards.  While their own complicity in human rights violations makes these claims 
hypocritical, it does demonstrate that they believed the norm was strong enough to be useful in 
their aims to discredit the United States.  Additionally, their discursive actions, even if solely 
strategic, reproduced the norm prohibiting torture.xcii  Third, though some liberal states were 
ambiguous in their initial reaction towards US abuse, they began to change their detainee policies in 
the last period to reflect the risk of abuse on the part of the United States.  Instead of moving from 
an ambiguous position to one of acceptance, as the coercion model implies, the opposite occurred.  
These three observations together point to a trend over the course of the Bush administration 
where the number of agents within international society willing to contest its preferences increased, 
which is certainly not suggestive of a norm cascade in the Bush administration’s favour.  Finally, the 
retreat to legitimation through domestic instead of international law only hurt the Bush 
administration’s chances at bringing about a norm cascade, and might indicate that it was aware of 
its inability to legitimate its personal preferences internationally and shifted its strategy to avoid the 
costs of openly contesting the norm, though this larger claim must be tempered with the knowledge 
that the Bush administration also faced increased domestic opposition during this time.   
There is thus no evidence that the conduct of the Bush administration led to a norm cascade 
with respect to its torture preferences, which would have required at a minimum a key group of 
states or international organisations to reflect the legitimation strategies of the United States.  From 
Dunne’s perspective in 2007, the prospect of norm cascade might have seemed more worrisome 
given the mixed reaction from liberal states to the prisoner abuse scandals.  However, other than 
Australia, liberal states stopped supporting US legitimation strategies, and instead joined an 
increasing trend of contestation concerning US conduct.  In the same vein, McKeown’s contention in 
2009 that the United States’ action could weaken the norm is not supported by the data.  
Alternatively, Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway’s argument in 2009 that the European states will 
uphold the norms in the face of US defection has some merit, but only towards the end of the 
period.  European states were latecomers to opposition, with international organisations and, 
perhaps ironically, states with poor human rights records, exerting the most discursive pressure on 
the United States to conform to the torture norm.   
Finally, given the material preponderance of the United States, the ample evidence that it 
was interested in and enacted policies that reflected a significantly reduced definition of torture, and 
some evidence of coercion among its European allies, the Bush administration’s inability to 
legitimate its preferences seems to indicate that materiality was not sufficient to bring about a norm 
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cascade in this case.  However, this does not mean that US material power was of no use.  On the 
contrary, there is some evidence that it was effective in mitigating public criticism from other 
western states, which might explain the dual nature of their reactions in 2004.  However, other than 
this, the material position of the United States was insufficient to legitimate its position and therein 
significantly change the norms of torture.   
There is no question that the post-9/11 security environment allowed the United States to 
temporarily relax its human rights standards, particularly given its ability to pay the costs of its 
illegitimate behaviour.  However, there is little evidence that the torture norm became less 
entrenched in international society.  Though this might be good news to human rights activists who 
might otherwise fear the effects of a successful international norm cascade, the case study also 
demonstrated that other states within the liberal core, when faced with coercive influences from the 
materially preponderant state, were not always willing to immediately speak out against severe 
human rights violations.  As such, it suggests that although present, the international prohibition of 
torture is possibly more fragile than many might wish; only reinforcing the need for continual 
scrutiny and vigilance to ensure that it is upheld.  
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